Almost
28 years earlier, in January 1989, the South African president, PW Botha, had a
mild stroke and decided unilaterally and without thinking too deeply about the
implications, to separate his position as president from that of leader of the
National Party. Ostensibly Botha wanted to ‘lighten his workload’ and to be
able fulfill the role as a national ‘unifier’ for all races. He resigned as party
leader in February and requested the party to elect a new leader. FW de Klerk’s
narrow victory as leader of the National Party on the same day set-in motion a
chain of events that led to Botha being forced out seven months later.
The
conflict that ensued between De Klerk and Botha was, at its core, a power
struggle between two centers of power. Botha became a president without a power base
(except for the one that he believed he had among all “good South Africans”),
and De Klerk felt that he had the base to implement his own reformist policies.
Over the next few months Botha pretended as if nothing has changed and tried to
continue with general policy-making decisions, including issues of national security,
foreign affairs, constitutional affairs and the economy, while De Klerk
attempted to stamp his authority on the government and began to contemplate some
progressive reforms. Clashes ranged from subtle barbs by Botha, challenging his
successor’s status and motives, and Botha’s private reception of the still-imprisoned
Nelson Mandela without consulting De Klerk.
The
hostility between the two men eventually turned into open conflict over the
date of the next general election and matters came to a head in August 1989, when
a seething Botha publicly challenged De Klerk on his meeting with Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia. The vast majority of the NP caucus supported De Klerk. Botha
had several options – he could fire the whole cabinet, call a general election
or resign. After a volatile cabinet meeting where a bitter Botha levied recrimination
against his colleagues, he announced his resignation on television the next
day. As Botha’s successor, De Klerk then continued to transform the South African
political landscape within the next six months.
While
the constitutional position in which PW Botha found himself in 1989 differs
from that which Zuma finds himself 28 years later, the principle of a weakened leader
without a loyal and legitimate powerbase remains the same. Ramaphosa will soon want
to change the direction of the country away from the ‘failing state’ that SA
has become under the corruption, state capture and incompetence of the Zuma
era. While Zuma has everything to gain from the status quo and still has his
grip on the levers of power as President, the center of gravity has dramatically
shifted to the new leader.
And
during his remaining time as President and probably much sooner, Zuma will learn
that Ramaposa’s power base has increased exponentially and that he will be directly
challenged on all fronts. This includes Zuma’s prerogative to appoint cabinet
ministers. Zuma’s short-term salvation might be that fact that 49% of the
congress voted for his preferred candidate Dlameni-Zuma, but even this leverage
will wear off as Ramaphosa tightens his grip on power. Conflict on policy and
administration will emerge between Zuma and Ramaphosa, just like between FW de
Klerk and PW Botha. Like Botha, Zuma will be on the losing side most of the
time, and he probably has less than six months left as President of South
Africa.
Johann van Rooyen, for Global Finances and Politics
